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ABSTRACT
In previous work, Boemer et al. introduced nGraph-HE, an exten-
sion to the Intel nGraph deep learning (DL) compiler, that enables
data scientists to deploy models with popular frameworks such
as TensorFlow and PyTorch with minimal code changes. However,
the class of supported models was limited to relatively shallow
networks with polynomial activations. Here, we introduce nGraph-
HE2, which extends nGraph-HE to enable privacy-preserving infer-
ence on standard, pre-trained models using their native activation
functions and number fields (typically real numbers). The proposed
framework leverages the CKKS scheme, whose support for real
numbers is friendly to data science, and a client-aided model using
a two-party approach to compute activation functions.
We first present CKKS-specific optimizations, enabling a 3x-88x
runtime speedup for scalar encoding, and doubling the through-
put through a novel use of CKKS plaintext packing into complex
numbers. Second, we optimize ciphertext-plaintext addition and
multiplication, yielding 2.6x-4.2x runtime speedup. Third, we ex-
ploit two graph-level optimizations: lazy rescaling and depth-aware
encoding, which allow us to significantly improve performance.
Together, these optimizations enable state-of-the-art throughput
of 1,998 images/s on the CryptoNets network. Using the client-aided
model, we also present homomorphic evaluation of (to our knowl-
edge) the largest network to date, namely, pre-trained MobileNetV2
models on the ImageNet dataset, with 60.4%/82.7% top-1/top-5 ac-
curacy and an amortized runtime of 381ms/image.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Mathematics of computing→Mathematical software; • Se-
curity and privacy→ Privacy-preserving protocols.
KEYWORDS
Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning; Deep Learning; Graph Com-
pilers; Homomorphic Encryption
1 INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of machine learning inference as a service raises
privacy questions and concerns. For example, a data owner may be
concerned about allowing an external party access to her data.
To appear in the 7th Workshop on Encrypted Computing & Applied Homomorphic
Cryptography (WAHC 2019).
Homomorphic encryption (HE) is an elegant cryptographic tech-
nology which can solve the data owner’s concern about data ex-
posure. HE is a form of encryption with the ability to perform
computation on encrypted data, without ever decrypting it. In par-
ticular, HE allows for a data owner to encrypt her data, send it to the
model owner to perform inference, and then receive the encrypted
inference result. The data owner accesses the result of the inference
by decrypting the response from the server.
The class of HE schemes known as leveled HE schemes or some-
what HE (SHE) schemes supports a limited number of additions
and multiplications. As such, these schemes are attractive solutions
to the DL based inference, whose core workload is multiplications
and additions in the form of convolutions and generalized matrix
multiplications (GEMM). One challenge in enabling HE for DL us-
ing SHE schemes is that we cannot compute non-linear functions,
common in deep neural networks activations.
Another challenge in enabling HE for DL is the lack of support
in existing frameworks. While popular DL frameworks such as
TensorFlow [2] and PyTorch [35] have greatly simplified the devel-
opment of novel DL methods, they do not support HE. Meanwhile,
existing HE libraries such as Microsoft SEAL [39], HElib [25], and
Palisade [37] are typically written at a level far lower than the prim-
itive operations of DL. As a result, implementing DL models in HE
libraries requires a significant engineering overhead.
nGraph-HE [6] introduced the first industry-class, open-source
DL graph compiler which supports the execution of DL models
through popular frameworks such as TensorFlow, MXNet, and Py-
Torch. Graph compilers represent DL models using a graph-based
intermediate representation (IR), upon which hardware-dependent
and hardware-agnostic graph optimizations are performed. By treat-
ing HE as a virtual hardware target, nGraph-HE takes advantage of
the graph compiler toolchain to create a framework for DL with HE.
nGraph-HE uses Microsoft SEAL [39] for the underlying HE evalua-
tion (with a framework for additional HE schemes), and nGraph [17]
for the graph compiler IR. nGraph-HE enabled data scientists to
use familiar DL frameworks; however, nGraph-HE supported only
a limited class of models, restricted to polynomial activations.
In this work, we present nGraph-HE21, which introduces a num-
ber of optimizations in the graph compiler and the HE library.
nGraph-HE2 utilizes a client-aided model, i.e. a hybrid approach
1nGraph-HE2 is available under the Apache 2.0 license at https://ngra.ph/he.
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using two-party computation, to execute a much wider class of pre-
trained deep neural networks including non-polynomial activations
with a focus on maximizing throughput. Our optimizations focus on
inference on encrypted data with a plaintext model. We use batch-
axis packing (Section 2.3.3) to enable a simple implementation of
the Reshape operation and significantly increase throughput.
This setting is friendly to data scientists. It supports standard
DL models,including non-polynomial activations. Since we do not
rely on HE-specific training models, the training phase is HE-
independent. Thus, data scientists can perform HE inference on
standard DL models without cryptographic expertise.
A challenge specific to this data-scientist-friendly setting is that
neural networks typically contain operations not suitable to all
HE schemes, particularly in the activation functions. For instance,
computing ReLU or MaxPool requires the comparison operator,
which is not supported in the CKKS HE scheme. To this end, we use
a protocol in which the server interacts with a client to perform non-
polynomial operations such as ReLU (Section 4.1). Nevertheless,
the CKKS scheme has several advantages, including support for
floating-point numbers, plaintext packing, and faster runtime.
We present three main contributions. First, we describe opti-
mizations to the CKKS encoding operations in SEAL (Section 3.1).
We demonstrate a 3x-88x improvement in scalar encoding, and
introduce complex packing, an optimization which doubles the
inference throughput in networks without ciphertext-ciphertext
multiplication (Section 3.1.2). Second, we introduce optimizations
to ciphertext-plaintext addition, and ciphertext-plaintext multipli-
cation, which apply in the batch-axis plaintext packing setting
(Section 3.2). Third, we exploit two graph-level optimizations (Sec-
tion 3.3). The first graph-level optimization, lazy rescaling, improves
the runtime of higher-level operations such as Dot and Convolu-
tion2 by delaying, hence minimizing the runtime spent on, the
expensive rescaling operation. The second graph-level optimiza-
tion, depth-aware encoding, minimizes the memory usage of the
encoded model by encoding at the appropriate coefficient modulus
level. Our just-in-time encoding implementation of depth-aware
encoding encodes the values as late as possible.
We evaluate our contributions on both small, single-operation
tests (Section 4.2), and on larger neural networks (Section 4.3). In
particular, we demonstrate state-of-the-art performance on the
CryptoNets network (Section 4.3.1), with a throughput of 1,998
images/s. Our contributions also enable the first, to our knowledge,
homomorphic evaluation of a network on the ImageNet dataset,
MobileNetV2, with 60.4%/82.7% top-1/top-5 accuracy and amor-
tized runtime of 381ms/image (Section 4.3.2). This is the first work
showing the privacy-preserving execution of a full production-level
deep neural network.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption (HE) enables computations to be carried
out on encrypted data. We will focus on the FV scheme (sometimes
referred to as BFV) [9, 22], as implemented in SEAL version 3.3 [39],
2Dot is a generalized dot product operation and Convolution is a batched convolution
operation; see https://www.ngraph.ai/documentation/ops for more information.
with the CKKS optimizations [13, 14] and the relinearization tech-
nique with the special prime [12]. This is a somewhat HE (SHE)
scheme, meaning that it supports a limited (and pre-determined)
number of additions and multiplications. In contrast, fully homo-
morphic encryption (FHE) schemes support an unlimited number
of additions and multiplications, typically by modifying an SHE
scheme with an expensive bootstrapping step.
More concretely, if ct1 and ct2 are encryptions ofm1 andm2,
respectively, then
Dec(ct1 + ct2) ≈m1 +m2, Dec(ct1 · ct2) ≈m1 ·m2 (1)
The imprecision in the arithmetic is due to noise introduced dur-
ing the computation, and can be controlled by setting encryption
parameters appropriately. CKKS also offers ciphertext-plaintext
operations, which are typically faster than ciphertext-ciphertext
operations in Equation 1. That is, if pt1 is an encoding ofm1, then
Dec(pt1 + ct2) ≈m1 +m2, Dec(pt1 · ct2) ≈m1 ·m2
2.2 Mathematical Background
Many homomorphic encryption schemes, including CKKS, are
based on the ring learning with error (RLWE) problem. A full de-
scription of the CKKS scheme and the RLWE problem is outside the
scope of this paper. Instead, we provide a brief introduction to the
CKKS scheme and refer the reader to [14, 33] for additional details.
Let ΦM (X ) be the Mth cyclotomic polynomial of degree N =
ϕ(M). The plaintext space is the ring R = Z[X ]/(ΦM (X )). We al-
ways take to be deg(ΦM (X )) a power of two, typically 2,048 or
4,096. This is for both performance and security reasons.
2.2.1 Rescaling. In most HE schemes, a message is encrypted by
adding noise. This noise grows with each homomorphic operation,
especially multiplication. To manage this noise growth, CKKS intro-
duces a rescaling operation which lowers the noise, and is typically
performed after every multiplication.
We can only perform a (predetermined) limited number of such
rescaling operations; therefore we can perform a (predetermined)
number of multiplications. We let L be this number. Each multipli-
cation represents a ‘level’ in our ciphertext space, and a rescaling
operation lowers the level. To implement this, we have a ‘layered’ ci-
phertext space, where each layer has a different ciphertext modulus.
We construct this space as follows. Let p1, . . . ,pL be primes, and let
psp be a ‘special prime.’ The ciphertext modulus is qL =
∏L
i=1 pi ,
yielding ciphertext space RqL = R/(qLR). Ciphertexts in the CKKS
scheme are typically pairs of polynomials, i.e., ct ∈ R2qL . The re-
linearization step (also referred to as the key-switching step) is
performed using the raise-the-modulus idea from [23] and the spe-
cial modulus psp .
Encryption is performed using the special prime; this means
a fresh ciphertext will be modulo qL · psp . We immediately per-
form a scale operation to reduce the level to that of qL , so that the
encryption algorithm’s final output is an element of RqL .
The rescaling algorithm is the homomorphic equivalent to the
removing inaccurate LSBs as a rounding step in approximate arith-
metic. More formally, we bring a ciphertext ct from level ℓ to ℓ′ by
computing
2
ct′ ←
⌊
ct
qℓ
q′
ℓ
⌉
(2)
where qℓ =
∏ℓ
i=1 pi . Typically, rescaling is performed with ℓ
′ =
ℓ − 1 after each multiplication to minimize noise growth. As such,
the encryption parameter L is typically set to be at least Lf , i.e.
L ≥ Lf , the multiplicative depth of the function to compute.
2.2.2 Double-CRT Representation. To enable fast modular arith-
metic modulo large integers, SEAL uses the residue number system
(RNS) to represent the integers. To use this, we choose the factors
qi in qℓ =
∏ℓ
i=1 pi to be pairwise coprime, roughly of the same
size and 64-bit unsigned integers (they are typically chosen to be
of size 30-60 bits). Then, using the Chinese remainder theorem,
we can write an element x in its RNS representation (also referred
to as the CRT representation.) (x (mod qi ))i . Each operation on x
can be implemented by applying the operation on each element
xi . In particular, addition and multiplication of two numbers in
RNS form are performed element-wise in O(L) time, rather than
O(L logL) time for multiplication, as would be required in a naive
representation.
SEAL also implements the number-theoretic transform (NTT)
for fast polynomial multiplication. Together, the CRT and NTT rep-
resentation is known as the ‘double-CRT’ form. However, the NTT
representation is incompatible with the rescaling operation. SEAL’s
rescaling operation requires performing an NTT−1, the rescaling
operation (2), then an NTT. The NTT and its inverse are relatively
expensive computations, hence we will describe optimizations for
avoiding them where possible (Section 3.3). A full description of
the NTT is beyond the scope of this paper; see for example [32] for
a cryptographer’s perspective of the NTT.
2.2.3 Plaintext Packing. An extremely useful feature of the CKKS
scheme is plaintext packing, also referred to as batching. This allows
us to âĂĲpackâĂİ N /2 complex scalar values into one plaintext or
ciphertext, where N is the cyclotomic polynomial degree. It works
by defining an encoding map CN /2 → R, where R is the plaintext
space. An operation (addition or multiplication) performed on an
element in R corresponds to the same operation performed on N /2
elements in CN /2. The number N /2 elements in the packing is also
known as the number of slots in the plaintext.
Let P = R refer to the plaintext space, and C = R∗qL refer to the
ciphertext space.
2.3 HE for Deep Learning
The ability of HE to perform addition and multiplication makes it
attractive to DL, whose core workloads are multiplication and addi-
tion in the form of convolutions and GEMM operations. However,
neural networks commonly contain operations not suitable to all
HE schemes, particularly in the activation functions. For instance,
computing ReLU or MaxPool requires the comparison operator,
which is not supported in all SHE schemes. At a high level, there-
fore, there are two broad approaches to enabling homomorphic
evaluation of a given DL model:
(1) HE-friendly networks: Modify the network to be HE-friendly,
and re-train.
(2) Pre-trained networks: Modify the HE scheme or protocol to
accommodate the network as is, ideally with no retraining.
2.3.1 HE-friendly Networks. In this setting, we assume (and re-
quire) that the data scientist has access to the entire DL workflow,
including training. Here, the network is re-trained with polyno-
mial activations, and max-pooling is typically replace with average
pooling. Low-degree polynomials may be used, as high-degree poly-
nomials result in prohibitively large encryption parameters due
to the large multiplicative depth. The CryptoNets network [24] is
the seminal HE-friendly network, using the f (x) = x2 activation
function to achieve ≈99% accuracy on the MNIST [30] handwritten
digits dataset. However, on larger datasets, the accuracy of HE-
friendly networks suffers. CHET [19] adopts a similar approach
on the CIFAR10 [29] dataset, instead using activation functions
f (x) = ax2 + bx , with a,b, ∈ R. This approach results in 81.5%
accuracy, down from 84% accuracy in the original model with ReLU
activations. Hesamifard et al. [26] see a similar drop-off in accuracy
from 94.2% to 91.5% on the CIFAR10 dataset. Depending on the use
case, such a drop in accuracy may not be acceptable.
From a practical viewpoint, HE-friendly networks tend to be
more difficult to train than their native counterparts. In particular,
polynomial activations are unbounded and grow more quickly than
standard activation functions such as ReLU or sigmoid, resulting in
numerical overflow during training. Possible workarounds include
weight and activation initialization and gradient clipping.
Sparsification methods, such as in SEALion [40] and Faster Cryp-
toNets [16] improve latency by reducing the number of homomor-
phic additions or multiplications. This is an optimization mostly
independent of HE.
2.3.2 Pre-trained Networks. In this setting, we assume a network
has been trained, and no modifications are possible. This setting re-
sults in independent training and inference tasks. In particular, data
scientists need not be familiar with HE to train privacy-preserving
models. Additionally, this setting preserves the accuracy of the
existing models, which tend to be higher than models built with
HE-friendly constraints. Two solutions to the pre-trained network
setting are FHE schemes and hybrid schemes.
FHE schemes. FHE schemes enable an unlimited number of addi-
tions and multiplications, allowing for arbitrary-precision polyno-
mial approximations of non-polynomial activations. However, due
to the expensive bootstrapping step used to cope with increasing
the computational depth, this approach is typically much slower
than alternatives. Some FHE schemes, such as TFHE [15] operate
on boolean circuits which support low-depth circuits for exact com-
putation of ReLU. However, performance on arithmetic circuits,
such as GEMM operations, suffers.
Wang, et al. [42] propose using Intel Software Guard Extensions
(SGX) to implement a bootstrapping procedure in a trusted exe-
cution environment (TEE). In effect, this approach turns a SHE
scheme to a FHE scheme with a lower performance penalty than
FHE bootstrapping. However, it loosens the security model, as the
TEE must be trusted.
Hybrid schemes. Hybrid schemes combine privacy-preserving
primitives, such as HE and multi-party computation (MPC). In MPC,
several parties follow a communication protocol to jointly perform
the computation. MPC techniques, such as garbled circuits (GCs),
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typically support a broader range of operations than HE, while
introducing a communication cost between the parties. Hybrid
HE-MPC schemes therefore provide an elegant solution to the pre-
trained network setting by using MPC to perform non-polynomial
activations, and HE to perform the FC and Convolution layers.
This approach has two important benefits. First, it enables exact
computation, mitigating the performance drop-off in HE-friendly
networks. Second, it enables smaller encryption parameters. The
HE-MPC interface involves refreshing the ciphertext at each non-
polynomial activation, i.e. resetting the noise budget and coefficient
modulus to the highest level L. This resetting reduces the effective
multiplicative depth of the computation to the number of multi-
plications between non-polynomial activations. As a result, L is
quite small, even for large networks. For instance, L = 3 suffices for
the MobileNetV2 network [38] (Section 4.3.2). Smaller L also en-
ables choice of smaller polynomial modulus degree, which greatly
reduces the runtime (see Appendix A.4) and memory usage.
Several hybrid schemes have been developed. Chimera [7] is a hy-
brid HE-HE schemewhich performs ReLU in TFHE, and affine trans-
formations in an arithmetic-circuit HE scheme such as FV or CKKS.
However, the translation between TFHE and FV/CKKS is potentially
expensive. MiniONN [31] is a hybrid HE-MPC scheme which uses
an additive HE scheme to generate multiplication triples, which are
used in an MPC-based evaluation of the network. Gazelle [27] uses
HE to perform the polynomial functions and GCs to perform the
non-polynomial activations.
Other schemes. A third solution to the pre-trained network set-
ting is pure MPC schemes. ABY [20] supports switching between
arithmetic, boolean, and Yao’s GCs. ABY3 [34] increases the perfor-
mance of ABY by introducing a third party. SecureNN [41] likewise
increases performance at the cost of a third party. Some two-party
MPC schemes also have shortcomings, such as requiring binariz-
ing the network [1]. Our work, in contrast, supports full-precision
networks using standard data types.
2.3.3 Challenges in deploying DL on HE.
Software Frameworks. One difficulty in enabling HE for DL
is the lack of support in existing frameworks. While popular DL
frameworks such as TensorFlow [2] and PyTorch [35] have greatly
simplified the development of novel DL methods, they do not sup-
port HE. Existing HE libraries such as Microsoft SEAL [39], HE-
lib [25], and Palisade [37] are typically written at a low level. As
such, implementing DL models requires a significant engineering
overhead. nGraph-HE [6] introduces a DL graph compiler which
supports execution of DL models through popular frameworks such
as TensorFlow, MXNet, and PyTorch.
Performance Considerations. One of the primary shortcom-
ings of HE is the large computational and memory overhead com-
pared to unencrypted computation, which can be several orders
of magnitude. The choice of encryption parameters, N and the
coefficient moduli qi , has a large impact on this overhead, as well
as the security level (see Appendix A.4). As such, parameter se-
lection, which remains a largely hand-tuned process, is vital for
performance.
Mapping to DL Functions. Another difficulty in enabling HE
for DL is the mapping from HE operations to DL operations. While
HE addition and multiplication map naturally to plaintext addition
and multiplication, there are various choices for plaintext pack-
ing (see Section 2.2). Both CryptoNets [24] and nGraph-HE [6] use
plaintext packing along the batch axis (batch-axis packing) to store a
4D tensor of shape (S,C,H ,W ) (batch size, channels, height, width)
as a 3D tensor of shape (C,H ,W ), with each ciphertext packing S
values. Each model weight is stored as a plaintext with the same
value in each slot (encoded using scalar encoding, see Section 3.1.1).
Since HE addition and multiplication are performed element-wise
on each slot, this enables inference on up to S data items simultane-
ously, where the runtime for one data item is the same as for S data
items (for S ≤ N /2, the slot count). As a result, this use of plaintext
packing greatly increases throughput for a given latency.
Other approaches such as Gazelle [27] and LoLa [10] use inter-
axis packing, a choice of plaintext packing which encrypts multiple
scalars from the same inference data item or weight matrix to the
same ciphertext. Inter-axis packing optimizes inference on one data
item at a time, with latency scaling linearly with the batch size. How-
ever, DL workloads on inter-axis packing often use HE rotations,
which are relatively expensive (see Appendix A.4). The optimal
packing approach depends on the workload, and can be determined
by graph compilers. nGraph-HE2 uses batch-axis packing.
2.4 Graph Compilers
Graph compilers represent DL models with a graph-based interme-
diate representation (IR). The primary advantage to a graph-based
IR is the enabling of graph-based optimizations, which can be ei-
ther hardware agnostic or hardware dependent. Intel nGraph [17]
is a DL graph compiler which optimizes the inference graph for
several hardware targets. A second advantage to graph-based IR is
the ability to represent models from different DL frameworks in a
common IR; thus, the graph-based optimizations are framework-
agnostic. nGraph-HE [6] introduces the first DL framework for
HE. nGraph-HE treats HE as a virtual hardware target and uses
Microsoft SEAL [39] for the underlying HE evaluation, as well as
a simple structure for adding other HE libraries. In addition to
graph-based optimizations, nGraph-HE provides run-time based
optimizations based on the values of the plaintext model.
CHET [19] is another graph-based compiler for HE. It uses inter-
axis packing to optimize the layout of each tensor, as opposed
to using batch-axis packing for every tensor, as in nGraph-HE.
SEALion [40] uses a graph compiler for automatic parameter selec-
tion, while lacking packing and value-based runtime optimizations.
3 CONTRIBUTIONS
We introduce the following contributions, which apply in the batch-
axis packing setting:
• CKKS encoding optimizations;
• CKKS arithmetic optimizations;
• graph-level optimizations.
The CKKS encoding optimizations include faster scalar encoding,
and complex packing, which doubles the throughput by taking ad-
vantage of the complex components of the plaintext encoding map.
Our arithmetic optimizations apply to ciphertext-plaintext addition,
and ciphertext-plaintext multiplication. The graph-level optimiza-
tions include lazy rescaling and depth-aware encoding, which reduce
the runtime spent rescaling and encoding, respectively.
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3.1 CKKS Encoding Optimizations
3.1.1 Scalar Encoding. Plaintext packing enables the encoding of
N /2 complex scalars into a single plaintext. For more efficient
addition and multiplication, SEAL stores each plaintext in double-
CRT form (performing an NTT on the polynomial, and storing
each coefficient in RNS form with respect to the pi ). At the top
level, (with L coefficient moduli), encoding requiresO(LN )memory
and O(LN logN ) runtime. Algorithm 1 shows the pseudocode for
general encoding, including the NTT.
Algorithm 1 General CKKS Encoding
1: function EncodeVector(c ∈ CN /2,q ∈ Z, s ∈ R)
2: p ∈ CN
3: p[0 : N /2] ← c
4: p[N /2 + 1 : N ] ← c∗
5: p ← DFT−1(p · s)
6: p ← [p]q
7: p ← NegacyclicNTT(p)
8: end function
SEAL additionally provides an optimized encoding algorithm in
the setting where the N /2 scalars are the same real-valued number.
This setting yields a simplified DFT−1 and NTT, resulting in an
implementation requiring O(LN ) runtime and memory. Both of
SEAL’s encoding implementations are general, that is they allow
arbitrary operations on the resulting plaintext.
Here, we optimize for the more restrictive case in which N /2
identical real-valued scalars are stored in the plaintext, for the entire
lifetime of the plaintext. Our use of batch-axis packing (see Sec-
tion 3.1.2) maintains this property on the plaintexts, since they are
used only for plaintext addition and multiplication. Other plaintext
packing schemes, such as inter-axis packing (see Section 2.3.3), how-
ever, do not maintain this property. Thus, scalar encoding applies
only in specific use-cases, including batch-axis packing.
Our optimization takes advantage of the fact that the general
CKKS encoding algorithm of N /2 identical real-valued scalars will
result in a plaintext with N identical values across the slots. See
Appendix A.3 for the proof of this property. So, rather than store
N copies of the same scalar, we modify the plaintext to store just a
single copy. This improves the memory usage and runtime each by a
factor of N , yieldingO(L) runtime and memory usage. Algorithm 2
shows the pseudocode for the scalar-optimized encoding algorithm.
Algorithm 2 CKKS Scalar encoding of c with respect to modulus
q at scale s
1: function EncodeReal(c ∈ R,q ∈ Z, s ∈ R)
2: y ∈ R
3: y ← [s · c]q
4: return y
5: end function
Note, SEAL implements a variant of Algorithm 2 for scalar encod-
ing; however it computes y ∈ RN , with yi ← [s · c]q ∀i , requiring
memory and runtime O(LN ). For comparison, Algorithm 2 avoids
the expensive copy of size N , decreasing the runtime compared to
SEAL’s implementation.
3.1.2 Complex packing. We introduce complex packing, an opti-
mization which doubles the inference throughput in cases without
ciphertext-ciphertext multiplication. One of the primary ways to
combat the large runtime and memory overhead of HE is to use
plaintext packing in the CKKS encoding mapping CN /2 → R (Sec-
tion 2.2.3). Neural network models, however, typically operate on
real numbers. As such, packing real-valued model weights or data
values utilizes at most half of the available computation. Complex
packing, on the other hand, utilizes the entire computational capac-
ity of plaintext packing.
For simplicity, letN = 4, so each plaintext and ciphertext encodes
two complex scalars. Given scalars a,b, c,d, f ,д,h,k ∈ R, let:
• REnc(a,b) = p(a,b) represent the plaintext encoding with a
in the first slot and b in the second slot.
• CEnc(a,b, c,d) = p(a + bi, c + di) encode a + bi in the first
slot, and c + di in the second slot.
• RDec(p(a,b)) = (a,b)
• CDec(p(a + bi, c + di)) = (a,b, c,d)
Let real packing refer to theREnc/RDec representation, and complex
packing refer to the CEnc/CDec representation. Then, let
p(a + bi, c + di)
p(f + дi, h + ki)
±→ p(a ± f + (b ± д)i, c ± h + (d ± k)i)
×→ p(af − bд + (aд + b f )i, ch − dk + (ck + dh)i)
represent element-wise (real) addition/subtraction and multiplica-
tion, respectively. Note, a given implementation of a plaintext may
not represent the plaintext slots internally as complex numbers.
SEAL, for instance, uses 64-bit unsigned integers. Instead, our pre-
sentation serves to illustrate the concept, which is independent of
the HE library’s specific implementation. Though we only consider
plaintexts here, the same logic also holds for ciphertexts.
Now, we consider the following element-wise computations:
• Add/Subtract:
(a,b, c,d) ± (f ,д,h,k) = (a ± f ,b ± д, c ± h,d ± k)
= CDec(CEnc(a,b, c,d) ±CEnc(f ,д,h,k))
• Broadcast-Multiply:
(a,b, c,d) × f = (af ,b f , c f ,d f )
= CDec(CEnc(a,b, c,d) ×CEnc(f , 0, f , 0))
• Multiply:
(a,b, c,d) × (f ,д,h,k) = (af ,bд, ch,dk))
, CDec(CEnc(a,b, c,d) ×CEnc(f ,д,h,k))
So, we observe each operation except Multiply3 can be represented
using complex packing. Furthermore, we can compose any number
of Add, Subtract, and Broadcast-Multiply, operations represented
using complex packing. Note, real packing supports these opera-
tions, as well as Multiply. However, real packing requires twice the
number of slots, i.e. two plaintexts, or doubling N .
3due to the cross-terms in (a+bi)×(f +дi) = af −bд+(aд+bf )i , af +bдi . Note,
it is an open problem to compute and add the correction term bд + (bд − aд − bf )i .
This is non-trivial because in this setting a, b are encrypted, and we can only use
complex multiplication to compute the cross-term.
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These properties easily generalize to larger N . In essence, com-
plex packing can perform the same computation (as long as it does
not include a ciphertext-ciphertext Multiply operation) as the real
packing representation on twice as many slots.
Now, following nGraph-HE, nGraph-HE2 uses batch-axis plain-
text packing (Section 2.3.3) during inference to store a 4D inference
tensor of shape (S,C,H ,W ) (batch size, channels, height, width) a
3D tensor of shape (C,H ,W ), with each ciphertext packing S values.
Each model weight is stored as a plaintext with the same value in
each slot (encoded using scalar encoding, see Section 3.1.1). Hence,
in a neural network, the FC and Convolution layers consist of only
Add, Subtract, and Broadcast-Multiply operations, suitable for com-
plex packing. Polynomial activations such as f (x) = x2, in contrast,
are not suited for complex packing since they require ciphertext-
ciphertext multiplications. However, ciphertext-ciphertext multipli-
cations are absent in many neural networks with ReLU activations.
For these networks, complex packing doubles the throughput.
Kim and Song [28] also propose complex packing, by modifying
the underlying HE scheme. Bergamaschi et al. [4] use a similar
complex packing idea to train logistic models in a genome-wide
association study (GWAS), with limited speedup due to the require-
ment of additional conjugation operations. Our use of complex
packing, on the other hand, applies to neural network inference,
and nearly doubles the throughput.
3.2 CKKS Arithmetic Optimizations
We introduce optimizations to ciphertext-plaintext addition and
multiplication in CKKS, which apply in the special case of batch-axis
packing. A further ciphertext-plaintext multiplication optimization
applies when the coefficient modulus is less than 32 bits.
3.2.1 Ciphertext-plaintext Addition. Ciphertext-plaintext addition
in RNS form requires element-wise addition of two polynomials in
which each sum is reduced with respect to the coefficient modulus
pℓ . With our scalar encoding approach, we instead perform sum-
mation of the same scalar with each element of a polynomial. Algo-
rithm 3 shows the ciphertext-plaintext vector algorithm, compared
to Algorithm 4, which shows the optimized ciphertext-plaintext
scalar addition algorithm. Both implementations require O(LN )
memory and runtime, however Algorithm 4 is more cache-friendly.
Algorithm 3 Ciphertext-Plaintext Vector Addition
1: function Add Cipher-Plain Vector(ct ∈ C, pt ∈ P)
2: for ℓ = 1 to L do
3: for n = 1 to N do
4: ct[ℓ][n] ← (ct[ℓ][n] + pt[ℓ][n]) mod pℓ
5: end for
6: end for
7: end function
Note that the same optimization works for ciphertext-plaintext
subtraction, and we expect similar improvements.
3.2.2 Ciphertext-plaintextMultiplication. Ciphertext-plaintextmul-
tiplication in RNS form requires element-wise multiplication of two
polynomials in which each product is reduced with respect to the
Algorithm 4 Ciphertext-Plaintext Scalar Addition
1: function Add Cipher-Plain Scalar(ct ∈ C, pt ∈ P)
2: for ℓ = 1 to L do
3: tmp ← pt[ℓ]
4: for n = 1 to N do
5: ct[ℓ][n] ← (ct[ℓ][n] + tmp) mod pℓ
6: end for
7: end for
8: end function
coefficient modulus ql . The modulus reduction is performed with
Barrett reduction [3]. We present two optimizations.
First, our scalar encoding allows us to perform multiplication
between a scalar and each element of the polynomial, rather than
between two polynomials. This is the same optimization as in
ciphertext-plaintext addition.
Second, we provide an optimization for the case inwhich the coef-
ficient modulus is 32 bits, rather than 64 bits. The benefit arises from
a simpler implementation of Barrett reduction which requires fewer
additions and multiplications. In SEAL, ciphertext and plaintext
elements are stored at 64-bit unsigned integers, with a maximum
modulus of 62 bits [39]. As a result, performing the multiplication
may overflow to 128 bits. Then, performing Barrett reduction re-
quires 5 multiplications, 6 additions, and 2 subtractions (including
the conditional subtraction). See Algorithm 5 for the pseudocode,
which closely follows SEAL’s implementation4. We store an un-
signed 128-bit number z as two unsigned 64-bit numbers with z[0]
containing the 64 low bits and z[1] containing the 64 high bits. The
add64 function will return the carry bits of the addition.
Algorithm 5 BarrettReduction128
1: function BarrettReduction128(128-bit number z, 64-bit
modulus q, 128-bit Barrett ratio r )
2: uint64 tmp1, tmp2[2], tmp3, carry
3: carry ←mult_hw64(z[0], r [0]) ▷ Multiply low bits
4: tmp2← z[0] ∗ r [1]
5: ▷ Compute high bits of z[0] ∗ r
6: tmp3← tmp2[1] + add64(tmp2[0], carry,&tmp1)
7: tmp2← z[1] ∗ r [0]
8: carry ← tmp2[1] + add64(tmp1, tmp2[0],&tmp1)
9: tmp1← z[1] ∗ r [1] + tmp3 + carry ▷ Compute [z ∗ r ]2128
10: tmp3← z[0] − tmp1 ∗ q ▷ Barrett subtraction
11: if tmp3 ≥ q then ▷ Conditional Barrett subtraction
12: result ← tmp3 − q
13: else
14: result ← tmp3
15: end if
16: return result
17: end function
In the case where q is a 32-bit modulus, the Barrett reduction be-
comes much simpler, requiring just 2 multiplications and 2 subtrac-
tions (including the conditional subtraction). Algorithm 6 shows the
4https://github.com/microsoft/SEAL/blob/3.3.0/native/src/seal/util/
uintarithsmallmod.h#L146-L187
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pseudocode for the more efficient Barrett reduction, which closely
follows SEAL’s implementation5. Algorithm 7 shows the general,
64-bit modulus implementation of ciphertext-plaintext multiplica-
tion. Note, SEAL uses Barrett64 reduction for rescaling, whereas
we use it for optimized ciphertext-plaintext multiplication.
Algorithm 8 shows the optimized 32-bit modulus implementation
of multiplication with a scalar plaintext. Note, the plaintext pt
contains only L entries, rather than N · L entries. Algorithm 7 and
Algorithm 8 both require O(LN ) runtime; however, Algorithm 8 is
more cache-friendly.
Algorithm 6 BarrettReduction64
1: function BarrettReduction64(64-bit number z, 32-bit mod-
ulus q, 64-bit Barrett ratio r )
2: uint64 carry
3: carry ←mult_hw64(z, r ) ▷ Compute [z · q]264
4: carry ← z − carry ∗ q ▷ Barrett subtraction
5: if carry ≥ q then ▷ Conditional Barrett subtraction
6: result ← carry − q
7: else
8: result ← carry
9: end if
10: return result
11: end function
Algorithm 7 Ciphertext-Plaintext 64-bit Multiplication
1: function Multiply Cipher-Plain 64-bit(ct ∈ C, pt ∈ ZL×N ,
128-bit Barrett ratio r )
2: for ℓ = 1 to L do
3: for n = 1 to N do
4: uint64 z[2];
5: z ← ct[ℓ][n] ∗ pt[ℓ][n] ▷ Perform multiplication
6: ct[ℓ][n] ← BarrettReduction128(z,qℓ , r )
7: end for
8: end for
9: end function
Algorithm 8 Ciphertext-Plaintext Scalar 32-bit Multiplication
1: function Multiply Cipher-Plain 32-bit(ct ∈ C, pt ∈ ZL ,
64bit Barrett ratio r )
2: for ℓ = 1 to L do
3: tmp ← pt[ℓ]
4: for n = 1 to N do
5: uint64 z;
6: z ← ct[ℓ][n] ∗ tmp ▷ Perform multiplication
7: ct[ℓ][n] ← BarrettReduction64(z,qℓ , r )
8: end for
9: end for
10: end function
5https://github.com/microsoft/SEAL/blob/3.3.0/native/src/seal/util/
uintarithsmallmod.h#L189-L217
Table 1: Benefit of lazy rescaling at level 0. Lazy rescaling
skips the rescaling, whereas naive rescaling performs an un-
necessary rescaling.
Operation Number of rescalings
Naive Rescaling Lazy Rescaling
Constant L − 1 L − 1
Multiply L L − 1
Add L L − 1
3.3 Graph-level Optimizations
In addition to the above low-level CKKS optimizations, we present
two graph-level optimizations.
3.3.1 Lazy Rescaling. Rescaling in CKKS can be thought of as a
procedure which homomorphically removes the inaccurate LSBs
in the (encrypted) message. See Section 2.2 for a longer description,
or [14] for full details. Due to the NTT and NTT−1, rescaling is ≈9x
more expensive than ciphertext-plaintext multiplication in SEAL
(see Appendix A.4). The naive rescaling approach rescales after
every multiplication. Lazy rescaling, on the other hand, minimizes
the number of rescaling operations by:
• rescaling only after a Fully-Connected (FC) or Convolution
layer, rather than after every multiplication therein;
• skipping rescaling if there are no subsequent multiplications
before the ciphertext is decrypted.
Since FC and Convolution layers each contain several multiplica-
tions per output element, the first optimization reduces the number
of rescaling operations performed by a factor of the inner dimension
(for FC layers) or window size (for Convolution layers).
The second optimization ensures rescaling happens only when
reducing the message scale is necessary. In particular, addition is
allowed post-multiplication, pre-rescaling. In the case where the
last two layers of a network (or before a ReLU activation in a hybrid
MPC-HE scheme, see Section 2.3.2) are FC-Add, Convolution-Add
or Multiply-Add, this ensures the rescaling is omitted entirely. Note,
for a choice of parameters with L = Lf , where Lf is the multi-
plicative depth of the function, this optimization is equivalent to
skipping rescaling to level 0. Table 1 shows an example where the
second optimization results in a skipped rescaling. Note, lazy rescal-
ing applies ‘Use rescaling sparingly’ from [5], to neural network
inference instead of a genome-wide association study (GWAS). The
GWAS setting has a closed-form semi-parallel logistic regression
model, whereas our setting involves long sequences of linear and
non-linear operations on tensors, e.g. convolutions, and pooling
operations.
3.3.2 Depth-aware Encoding. The runtime complexity and mem-
ory usage of encoding a scalar at level ℓ in SEAL are both O(N ℓ)
(see Section 3.1.1). Throughout the execution of HE operations, the
level ℓ decreases due to the rescaling operation (see Section 2.2.1).
When multiplying or adding a ciphertext ct at level ℓ < L with a
plaintext pt, it is therefore advantageous to encode pt at level ℓ
rather than level L, as noted by the ‘Harnessing the CRT ladder’
technique in [5]. This will reduce both the runtime and memory
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usage of the encoding step. In practice, this implementation can
have two forms:
(1) Compile-time encoding. An optimization pass through the
computation graph can identify the level at which each plain-
text is encoded. This compilation step requires a larger initial
memory overhead, for the benefit of increased runtime.
(2) Lazy encoding. In this implementation, the plaintext model
weights are stored in native scalar (i.e. floating-point) for-
mat, and encoding is delayed until immediately preceding
multiplication or addition with a ciphertext ct. The level
ℓ at which to encode the model weight is determined by
observing the level of ct.
If encoding is expensive compared to addition/multiplication (as in
SEAL, see Appendix A.4), compile-time encoding yields the fastest
runtime. However, due to the choice batch-axis packing, nGraph-
HE2’s scalar encoding (Section 3.1.1) is significantly cheaper than
addition/multiplication, requiring runtime and memory O(ℓ), com-
pared toO(ℓN logN ) runtime andO(ℓN )memory usage of general
encoding. Hence, performing lazy encoding at runtime results in
little slowdown, and allows for a simpler implementation.
Here, we introduced CKKS-specific optimizations to scalar en-
coding, ciphertext-plaintext addition, and ciphertext-plaintext mul-
tiplication in the batch-axis packing case. We also introduced graph-
level optimizations of complex packing and depth-aware encoding.
4 EVALUATION
We evaluate our optimizations on small, single-operation tests (Sec-
tion 4.2), as well as on larger neural networks (Section 4.3). All
results are computed on Intel Xeon® Platinum 8180 2.5GHz sys-
tems with 376GB of RAM and 112 cores, running Ubuntu 16.04. The
localhost bandwidth is 46.2Gbit/s, and the local area network (LAN)
bandwidth is 9.4Gbit/s. We use GCC 7.4 with -O2 optimization.
4.1 Client-aided Model
To mitigate the classification accuracy degradation of HE-friendly
networks (Section 2.3), we implement a simple two-party computa-
tion approach. Specifically, evaluate a non-polynomial function f
on a ciphertext ct, the server sends ct to the client, which decrypts
Dec(ct) → pt, computes f (pt) , and sends a fresh encryption of the
result, Enc(f (pt)) to the server. This approach accomplishes two
tasks: first, it enables the computation of non-polynomial functions;
second, it refreshes the ciphertext, i.e. resets the noise budget and
coefficient modulus to the highest level L. However, this approach
can leak information about the model to the client, as it provides
the pre-activation values pt to the client, as well as the activation
function itself. One possible improvement is performing the non-
polynomial function using additive masking and garbled circuits,
as in Gazelle [27]. Another approach is to perform the decryption,
non-polynomial activation, and encryption in a trusted execution
environment (TEE) attested to the user, such as Intel’s Software
Guard Extensions (SGX) [11]. For instance, Wang et. al [42] use
Intel’s SGX for bootstrapping only, though this approach is easily
adapted to perform the non-polynomial activation as well.
Our client-aided approach, therefore, represents a placeholder
for more secure implementations in future work. Since the client-
aided model refreshes ciphertexts at each non-polynomial layer, the
Table 2: Runtime andmemory usagewhen encoding a scalar,
with and without optimization (Opt.). Runtimes are aver-
aged across 1000 trials.
N L Opt. Memory Runtime
Usage (bytes) Improv. Time (ns) Speedup
212 1 ✗ 32,768 605
212 1 ✓ 8 4,096 177 3.4
213 3 ✗ 196,608 2,951
213 3 ✓ 24 8,192 202 14.6
214 8 ✗ 1,048,576 38,938
214 8 ✓ 64 16,384 443 87.9
effective multiplicative depth is reduced to the multiplicative depth
between non-polynomial layers. This enables the computation of
arbitrarily-deep neural networks with much smaller encryption
parameters, and therefore much faster runtimes.
4.2 Low-level Operations
4.2.1 Scalar Encoding. We implement the scalar encoding opti-
mization from Section 3.1.1. Table 2 shows the speedup of several
parameter choices, each satisfying λ = 128-bit security. As expected,
the memory improvement is a factor of N . The runtime improve-
ment of scalar encoding increases with N , due to the O(L) runtime,
compared to O(LN logN ) in the general encoding.
4.2.2 Ciphertext-plaintext Addition. We implement the scalar ad-
dition optimization from Section 3.2.1. Table 3 shows a speedup
of 2.6x-4.2x, with more speedup for larger encryption parameters.
Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4 both haveO(LN ) runtime complexity.
The primary source of speedup, therefore, is due to the fact that one
of the two operands, the scalar, is kept into the processor registers,
and the other operand does not have to compete for its placement
and retrieval from the cache memory.
Table 3: Runtime improvement in ciphertext-plaintext
scalar addition. Parameter choices satisfy λ = 128-bit secu-
rity. Runtimes are averaged across 1000 trials.
N L
Runtime (µs)
General Scalar Speedup
212 1 2.3 0.9 2.6
213 3 12.6 4.5 2.8
214 8 124.5 30.0 4.2
4.2.3 Ciphertext-plaintext Multiplication. We implement the scalar
multiplication optimization from Section 3.2.2. Table 4 shows a
speedup of 2.6x for different parameter choices. Notably, the pa-
rameters uses 30-bit coefficient moduli, so our Barrett reduction
optimization applies.
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Table 4: Runtime improvement in ciphertext-plaintext
scalar multiplication. Parameter choices satisfy λ = 128-bit
security. Runtimes are averaged across 1000 trials.
N L
Runtime (µs)
General Scalar Speedup
213 3 181.7 71.1 2.6
214 8 966.6 377.6 2.6
Table 5: Impact of lazy rescaling on CryptoNets runtime us-
ing N = 213,L = 6, with accuracy 98.95%.
Thread
Count
Lazy
Rescaling
Runtime
Amortized (ms) Total (s)
1 ✗ 59.21 242.51 ± 3.69
1 ✓ 7.23 29.62 ± 0.63
24 ✓ 0.50 2.05 ± 0.11
4.3 Neural Network Workloads
To evaluate our graph-level optimizations and complex packing, we
evaluate two neural networks: the standard CryptoNets [24] model,
and MobileNetV2 [38]. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
largest network whose linear layers have been homomorphically
evaluated, as well as the first homomorphic evaluation of a network
on the ImageNet dataset.
4.3.1 CryptoNets. The CryptoNets network [24] is the seminal HE-
friendly DL model for the MNIST handwritten digits dataset [30].
The architecture uses f (x) = x2 for the activations, and has a
multiplicative depth of 5. See Appendix A.1 for the full architecture.
As in [24], we achieve 98.95% accuracy. Table 5 shows lazy rescaling
reduces the runtime of the CryptoNets network by ≈8x. Multi-
threading further improves the performance (see Appendix A.2).
In order to show the benefits of complex packing (Section 3.1.2),
we implement the client-aided model (Section 4.1). We train the
CryptoNets network with ReLU activations rather than x2 acti-
vations, and add bias terms. See Appendix A.1 for the complete
architecture. The use of ReLU activations effectively decreases the
multiplicative depth to 1, since the client-aided computation of
ReLU refreshes the ciphertexts. This lower multiplicative depth
enables much smaller encryption parameters, N = 211,L = 1, with
a single 54-bit coefficient modulus.
Table 6 shows the improvement due to complex packing. Com-
plex packing does not take advantage of our scalar encoding opti-
mization (Section 3.1.1), slightly increasing the runtime from the
real packing case. Nevertheless, complex packing roughly halves
the amortized runtime by doubling the capacity.
The total runtime is much smaller than the runtime in Table 5,
due to the use of much smaller encryption parameters. The amor-
tized runtime is also improved, though less dramatically. Note, the
communication overhead between the server and client accounts
Table 6: Impact of complex packing on CryptoNets with
ReLU activations using N = 211,L = 1, and 98.62% accuracy.
Results are averaged over 10 trials. Amt. times are amortized
over the largest batch size supported.
Thread
Count
Complex
packing
Network
setting
Batch
size
Runtime
Amt. (ms) Total (s)
1 ✗ localhost 1,024 2.72 2.79 ± 0.06
1 ✓ localhost 2,048 1.44 2.94 ± 0.04
24 ✓ localhost 2,048 0.24 0.50 ± 0.04
24 ✓ LAN 2,048 0.34 0.69 ± 0.04
Table 7: CryptoNets performance comparison, including ac-
curacy (Acc.), latency (Lat.), and throughput (Thput.). For hy-
brid protocols, latency is reported in the LAN setting and
communication (Comm.) includes only the interactive part
of the protocol.
Method Acc.
(%)
Lat.
(s)
Thput.
(im/s)
Protocol Comm.
(MB/im)
LoLa [10] 98.95 2.2 0.5 HE
FHE-DiNN100 [8] 96.35 1.65 0.6 HE
CryptoNets [24] 98.95 250 16.4 HE
Faster CryptoNets [16] 98.7 39.1 210 HE
nGraph-HE [6] 98.95 16.7 245 HE
CryptoNets 3.2 [10] 98.95 25.6 320 HE
nGraph-HE2 98.95 2.05 1,998 HE
Chameleon [36] 99 2.24 1.0 HE-MPC 5.1
MiniONN [31] 98.95 1.28 2.4 HE-MPC 44
Gazelle [27] 98.95 0.03 33.3 HE-MPC 0.5
nGraph-HE2-ReLU 98.62 0.69 2,959 HE-MPC 0.03
for roughly 27% of the runtime in the LAN setting. Optimizing the
communication leaves room for future improvement.
Table 7 shows the performance of nGraph-HE2 on the Cryp-
toNets network compared to existing methods. Lola and Gazelle
optimize for latency at the cost of reduced throughput. Other
methods, such as CryptoNets, Faster CryptoNets, and nGraph-HE
adopt the same batch-axis packing as we do, thereby optimizing
for throughput. Our method achieves the highest throughput of
1,998 images/s on the CryptoNets network. Furthermore, the client-
aided model enables an even higher throughput of 2,959 images/s.
Notably, the latency of our approach is much smaller than previ-
ous batch-axis packing approaches, and has similar runtime as the
latency-optimized LoLa, while achieving much larger throughput.
4.3.2 MobileNetV2. ImageNet [21] is a dataset used for image
recognition, consisting of colored images, ≈1.2 million for train-
ing, and 50,000 for validation, classified into 1,000 categories. The
images vary in size, though they are commonly rescaled to shape
224 × 224 × 3. The large number of categories and large image
resolution make ImageNet a much more difficult task than MNIST
or CIFAR10 [29]. MobileNetV2 [38] is a lightweight network archi-
tecture which achieves high accuracy on ImageNet with a small
number of parameters and multiply-accumulate operations. Mo-
bileNets are parameterized by an expansion factor, which can be
used to reduce the model size, resulting in a faster runtime at the ex-
pense of lower accuracy. The ReLU activations reduce the effective
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Table 8: MobileNetV2 results on localhost and LAN settings using complex packing, batch size 4096, 56 threads, and encryption
parameters N = 212,L = 3 at λ = 128-bit security. Runtimes are averaged across 10 trials. Encrypting the data reduces the top-1
accuracy by an average of 0.0136%, ≈7 images in 50,000.
MobileNetV2
Model
Unencrypted
Accuracy (%)
Encrypted
Accuracy (%)
Runtime
Communication
(MB/image)
Memory
(GB)Localhost LAN
Top-1 Top-5 Top-1 Top-5 Amt. (ms) Total (s) Amt. (ms) Total (s) Client Server
0.35-96 42.370 67.106 42.356 (−0.014) 67.114 (+0.008) 27 112 ± 5 71 292 ± 5 38.4 8.6 60.3
0.35-128 50.032 74.382 49.982 (−0.050) 74.358 (−0.024) 46 187 ± 4 116 475 ± 10 63.7 12.6 100.4
0.35-160 56.202 79.730 56.184 (−0.018) 79.716 (−0.014) 71 290 ± 7 197 807 ± 19 107.5 17.9 161.0
0.35-192 58.582 81.252 58.586 (+0.004) 81.252 (−0.000) 103 422 ± 23 278 1,141 ± 22 152.2 24.2 239.2
0.35-224 60.384 82.750 60.394 (+0.010) 82.768 (+0.018) 129 529 ± 18 381 1,559 ± 27 206.9 56.9 324.3
Figure 1: Runtime vs. Image size of LAN and localhost Mo-
bileNetV2 models. Table 8 shows the corresponding accura-
cies.
multiplicative depth, enabling use of small encryption parameters,
N = 212 and L = 3 coefficient moduli at λ = 128-bit security.
Furthermore, the lack of ciphertext-ciphertext multiplications en-
ables use of complex packing. We demonstrate nGraph-HE2 on
MobileNetV2 with expansion factor 0.35, and image ranging from
size 96 × 96 to the full size, 224 × 224.
Table 8 shows the results from MobileNetV2 inference on a
variety of image sizes. The large increase in runtime from the
localhost setting to the LAN setting is due to the communication
overhead. The localhost setting therefore represents a lower-bound
to the timings possible in the LAN setting. Notably, the accuracy
degradation due to HE is ≈0.01%, less than 7 images in 50,000.
Figure 1 shows the increase in runtime with larger images sizes,
and the significant latency introduced by the LAN setting.
5 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
Homomorphic encryption is a promising solution to preserving
privacy of user data during DL inference. Current DL solutions
using HE induce significant slowdown and memory overhead com-
pared to performing inference on unencrypted data. One potential
solution to this overhead is the use of plaintext packing, which en-
ables storing multiple scalars in a single plaintext or ciphertext. The
choice of how to use plaintext packing typically either increases
throughput, via batch-axis plaintext packing, or reduces latency,
via inter-axis plaintext packing.
In this work, we presented nGraph-HE2, which introduced sev-
eral optimizations to SEAL’s implementation of the CKKS encryp-
tion scheme, for batch-axis plaintext packing. Our optimizations
result in a 3x-88x improvement in scalar encoding, a 2.6x-4.2x
speedup in ciphertext-plaintext scalar addition, and a 2.6x speedup
in ciphertext-plaintext multiplication.
We also introduced lazy rescaling, a CKKS-specific graph-based
optimization which reduces the latency by 8x on the CryptoNets
network. Additionally, we introduced complex packing, which dou-
bles the throughput with minimal effect on runtime.
Together, these optimizations enable state-of-the art throughput
of 1,998 images/s for the CryptoNets network for theMNIST dataset.
Furthermore, the integration of our approach with nGraph-HE en-
ables inference on pre-trained DL models without modification.
To demonstrate this capability, we presented the first evaluation
of MobileNetV2, the largest DL model with linear layers evalu-
ated homomorphically, with 60.4%/82.7% top-1/top-5 accuracy, and
amortized runtime of 381ms/image. To our knowledge, this is also
the first evaluation of a model with encrypted ImageNet data.
One avenue for futurework involves performing non-polynomial
activations securely. In our approach, a client computes activations
such as MaxPool and ReLU by first decrypting, the computing
the non-linearity in plaintext, then encrypting the result. In the
near future, we plan to add support for other privacy-preserving
primitives, e.g., Yao’s Garbled Circuit, to provide a provably privacy-
preserving solution. Other directions for future work include fur-
ther optimization of scalar encoding for complex numbers, and
optimizing plaintext-ciphertext addition and multiplication with
Intel Advanced Vector Extensions (AVX).
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A APPENDIX
A.1 Network Architectures
For each architecture, n indicates the batch size.
• CryptoNets, with activation Act(x) = x2.
(1) Conv. [Input: n × 28 × 28; stride: 2; window: 5 × 5; filters:
5, output: n × 845] + Act.
(2) FC. [Input: n × 845; output: n × 100] + Act.
(3) FC. [Input: n × 100; output: n × 10].
• CryptoNets-ReLU, with activation Act(x) = ReLU (x).
(1) Conv with bias. [Input: n× 28× 28; stride: 2; window: 5× 5;
filters: 5, output: n × 845] + Act.
(2) FC with bias. [Input: n × 845; output: n × 100] + Act.
(3) FC with bias. [Input: n × 100; output: n × 10].
A.2 Parallel Scaling
nGraph-HE [6] uses OpenMP [18] to parallelize high-level opera-
tions such as Dot and Convolution. As such, the runtime depends
heavily on the number of threads. For the CryptoNets network with
N = 213,L = 6, Figure 2 shows the latency decreases linearly with
the number of threads up to thread count 16. Best performance
is achieved with 88 threads. However, the performance with 24
threads is just 9% slower (1.87s vs. 2.05s) than with 88 threads, rep-
resenting a better runtime-resource tradeoff. In general, the optimal
number of threads will depend on the network.
Figure 2: Runtimes on CryptoNets network with different
number of threads. Runtimes are averaged across 10 trials.
A.3 Scalar Encoding
Lemma 1. Refer to Algorithm 1 for the general CKKS encoding
algorithm. If the input vector c consists of the same real number r
in each slot, then the output plaintext p will contain the same real
number in each slot.
Proof. We refer to the notation in Algorithm 1. Since c ∈ RN /2,
c = c∗, and so line 3 and line 4 yield p ← (r , r , . . . , r ), the same
value in every slot. Now, we show
DFT−1(r , r , . . . , r ) = (r , 0, 0, . . . , 0).
The DFT−1 can be represented by a matrix transformationW ∈
CN×N withW =
(
w jk
)
0≤j,k≤N−1 for w jk =
ω−jk
N where ω =
e−2π i/N is a primitive N th root of unity. In particular, the first row
ofW consists of all ones, and the sum of every jth row for j , 0 is
0, since
N−1∑
k=0
ω−jk
N
=
1
N
(
ω j (1 − ω−jN )
ω j − 1
)
= 0
where the last equality uses that ω is a root of unity. Now, since p
has all the same values,
DFT−1 (r , . . . , r ) = (∑
i
pi/N , 0, . . . , 0
)
= (r , 0, . . . , 0).
Scaling by s yields (rs, 0, . . . , 0). The modulus reduction (line 6)
yields ([rs]q , 0, . . . , 0). Finally, the negacyclic NTT (line 7) can also
be represented by a matrix transformation in the finite field Z/qZ,
the integers modulo q. As with the DFT−1 matrix, the first row is
all ones, hence
NegacyclicNTT(([rs]q , 0, . . . , 0)) = [rs]q (1, 1, . . . , 1).
Thus, the CKKS encoding has the same scalar, [rs]q , in each slot. □
A.4 SEAL Performance Test
Table 9 shows the runtimes from SEAL’s CKKS performance tests.
The runtime increases with N and L. In general, larger L supports
more multiplications. However, to maintain the same security level,
N must be increased accordingly.
Table 9: SEAL CKKS performance test. Parameters satisfy
λ = 128-bit security. Runtimes averaged across 1000 trials.
Operation
Runtime (µs)
N = 212
L = 2
N = 213
L = 4
N = 214
L = 8
Add 16 59 237
Multiply plain 58 234 936
Decrypt 54 214 883
Square 105 476 2,411
Multiply 155 709 3,482
Rescale 440 2,224 10,189
Encode 1,654 4,029 10,989
Encrypt 1,514 4,808 16,941
Relinearize 936 4,636 27,681
Decode 2,153 7,372 30,175
Rotate one step 1,098 5,294 30,338
Rotate random 4,683 25,270 158,905
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